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I. INTRODUCTION
Need to take your girlfriend to the movies but tight on cash? Got a baby who
doesn’t wait until payday? Forgot to buy a wedding gift for your bridezilla
sister? Don’t wait for pay day—download a wage-advance app and get your
hard-earned money instantly with no fees, interest, or credit check required.1
Think it’s too good to be true?2 You’re probably right.3
In recent years, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has cracked down on

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2021; B.A.,
Philosophy and Political Science, San Diego State University, 2018. I would like to thank Distinguished
Professor Michael P. Malloy for his continued support, guidance, and review of my Comment throughout this
extensive process. I would also like to thank the Board of Directors and editorial staff for their commitment and
hard work in making this volume a success. Lastly, I would like to dedicate this Comment to my family, for
instilling in me a healthy sense of frugality and resourcefulness, but never allowing me to compromise on the
price of my dreams.
1. Earnin App, Earnin TV Commercial, ‘Movie Tickets’, ISPOT.TV, https://www.ispot.tv/ad/dpIE/earninmovie-tickets (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. See Cyrus Farivar, Millions Use Earnin to Get Cash Before Payday. Critics Say the App is Taking
Advantage
of
Them,
NBC
UNIVERSAL
(July
26,
2019,
1:41
AM)
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/millions-use-earnin-get-cash-payday-critics-say-app-taking-n1034071
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“They just portray it as being so simply and so easy.”).
3. See id. (discussing the sneaky business practices of tip-based wage-advance companies).
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the ruthless business practices of the payday lending industry.4 And with the
news of a $1.27 billion judgment against AMG Capital Management for
deceptive lending practices, the Ninth Circuit cemented its broad support for the
FTC’s recent crusade.5 But as the confetti settles over the FTC’s most recent win
against payday lenders, a new and unregulated industry emerges in the financial
market.6
Wage-advance businesses are attracting a young, strapped-for-cash crowd
through the use of smartphone applications (“apps”) that offer “no strings
attached” paycheck advances. 7 Companies like Earnin use catchy commercials
featuring everyday people short on cash to show the ease and expedience of the
app’s use.8 Seeking to distinguish themselves from traditional short-term, highfee payday loans, the wage-advance apps call money transfers “activations”
instead of “loans” and claim to offer the money without interest rates or fees. 9
The only catch: a noncompulsory tip, defaulted to ten percent of the amount
borrowed.10 Easy, right?11 Wrong.12
On closer scrutiny, a five dollar tip on a four day advance of $100 equals an
annual percentage rate (“APR”) of 456%.13 One man praised the Earnin app
online, stating he would regularly tip $30–$35 for every $500 he received.14
4. See FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 426 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, No. 19-508,
2020 WL 3865250 (July 9, 2020) (holding AMG Management Capital liable for deceptive business practices
regarding the terms of their payday loans); see also Julia Kagan, Payday Loan Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (July
15, 2019) https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/payday-loans.asp (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (defining a payday loan as “a type of short-term borrowing where a lender will extend highinterest credit based on a borrower’s income and credible profile.”).
5. See AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d at 426 (holding AMG Management Capital liable for
deceptive business practices regarding the terms of their payday loans).
6. See generally id. at 426 (ruling in favor of the FTC regarding the deceptive business practices of the
payday lending company, AMG Management Capital).
7. Gaby Del Valle, How a Silicon Valley Startup is Trying to Rebrand Payday Loans, VOX (May 22,
2019, 4:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2019/5/22/18636049/earnin-app-startup-payday-loans-fintech
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see Earnin TV Commercial, ‘Movie Tickets’, supra note
1 (advertising the Earnin app through iPhone-esc videos of young people who use the app to receive advances
on their paycheck); see also Stephen Middlebrook, What Business Lawyers Should Know About Wage Advance
Products,
ABA
(Sept.
5,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2019/09/wage-advance/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining wage-advances as businesses that provides borrowers with
instant access to earned wages, due back on receipt of payday).
8. Earnin TV Commercial, ‘Movie Tickets’, supra note 1.
9. Farivar, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. See id. (“They just portray it as being so simply and so easy.”).
12. Id. (discussing the sneaky business practices of tip-based wage-advance companies).
13. See generally Adam Hayes, Annual Percentage Rate (APR), INVESTOPEDIA (Jul 15, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/apr.asp (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining
an annual percentage rate as “the annual rate charged for borrowing or earned through an investment.”); Farivar,
supra note 2.
14.
@IAcewingI,
REDDIT
(January
31,
2019,
8:42
PM),
https://www.reddit.com/r/IsItBullshit/comments/9xzn14/isitbullshit_the_earnin_app/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Another reviewer commented on the post, warning that such a tip equals a 156%
APR.15 Missouri State Senator, Jill Schupp, opined, “[t]o use the word ‘tip’
instead of a usury charge, an interest rate or a fee, it’s just semantics. It’s the
same thing at the end of the day.”16
Other smartphone apps—such as Dave—operate through a small monthly fee
to use their services, ranging from $1–29.17 But on a $100 loan, a ten dollar
monthly fee could equal a 117.7% APR.18 While each wage-advance company’s
model is different, they all have one thing in common: skirting federal and state
payday lending and banking laws.19
Wage-advance apps are payday lenders in disguise, charging “tips” or “fees”
in place of the traditional interest rate.20 Such companies enjoy the benefits of
covert, inflated interest rates without the burden of state and federal oversight
placed on the payday lenders with whom they compete.21 In states that highly
regulate short-term lending, these tipping schemes constitute “deceptive business
practices” under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).22 This Comment
argues that both state and federal governments should treat wage-advance
businesses and payday lenders uniformly and implement stronger standards for
both industries through FTC litigation, rules akin to those of the original Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection (“CFPB”) 2017 Rules, and stricter state laws
criminalizing the fraudulent conduct of loan sharks. 23

15.
@myerbrigg,
REDDIT
(February
25,
2019,
10:34
PM),
https://www.reddit.com/r/IsItBullshit/comments/9xzn14/isitbullshit_the_earnin_app/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. Farivar, supra note 2.
17. Anna Serio, 5 Pay Advance Apps Like Earnin, FINDER (May 20, 2019), https://www.finder.com/payadvance-apps-like-earnin (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
18. How Do Payday Loans Work? IN CHARGE DEBT SOLUTION, https://www.incharge.org/debtrelief/how-payday-loans-work/ (last visited on Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (explaining how an APR on a payday loan is calculated by dividing the amount of interest paid [here,
$10] by the amount borrowed [here, $100], multiplying that by 365, then dividing that number by the length of
the repayment term [here, around 31 days], and finally multiplying that by 100 [totaling an APR of 117.7%]).
19. Farivar, supra note 2.
20. See id. (asserting that wage-advance companies are virtually acting as a payday lender).
21. See id. (noting that wage-advance apps do not have to conform to conventional lending regulations
due to their lack of a traditional interest rate or debt collectors when customers fail to pay).
22.
See, e.g., PayDay Loan Consumer Information, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM.,
https://paydayloaninfo.org/state-information (last visited Mar. 6, 2020), (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (discussing the various states, including New York and Arkansas, that protect their
constituents from payday lending by limiting or completely prohibiting the industry); see generally AMG
Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d at 426 (ruling in favor of the FTC regarding the deceptive business practices of
the payday lending company, AMG Management Capital).
23. See generally AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d at 426 (ruling in favor of the FTC regarding the
deceptive business practices of the payday lending company, AMG Management Capital); see also Jim
Puzzanghera, Consumer Protection Bureau Cracks Down on Payday Lender with Tough Nationwide
Regulations, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017, 3:40 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-paydayloan-regulations-20171005-story.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing new
rules for payday lenders introduced by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2017).
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To that end, this Comment proceeds in four parts. 24 Part II introduces payday
lending and wage-advance practices and highlights the similarities and
differences between the two industries.25 Part II then argues that because the two
industries operate through identical structures, the government should regulate
them similarly.26 Part III addresses states’ current inability to regulate payday
lenders effectively, as well as the federal government’s past and present struggles
to regulate the industry.27 Part IV proposes various regulations that federal and
state governments should implement to guard against the abuse and limit the
discretion from which the wage-advance and payday lending industries currently
benefit.28
II. THE PAYDAY LENDING & WAGE-ADVANCE INDUSTRIES
Angela Garcia frantically grabbed her toddler’s car seat as a tow-truck hauled
away her Chevy Suburban.29 The cost of her only mode of transportation was a
defaulted $3,200 loan from Loan Mart.30 With Christmas fast approaching, the
single mother of six needed a little extra cash to get her through the holidays and
pay her monthly bills.31 Garcia took out a loan, and, like clockwork, she threw
hundreds of dollars at the loan each month.32 Despite her religious monthly
repayments, Garcia was unaware of the loan’s high percentage rate and—like
many Americans—found herself even more hopeless than when she took out the
loan.33
Angela’s story is not uncommon.34 One study found that 87% of Oklahoma
payday lendees borrowed money more than once within a year.35 Of those
borrowers, 59% opened a new payday loan the same day they repaid the previous
loan.36 Another study found that, on average, 37% of borrowers defaulted within

24. Infra Parts II, III, IV.
25. Infra Part II.
26. Infra Part II.
27. Infra Part III.
28. Infra Part IV.
29. CalMatters, As More Californians Borrow at Triple-Digit Interest Rates, Will the State Crack Down
on ‘Predatory Lending’?, THE OCR (May 15, 2019), https://www.ocregister.com/2019/05/15/as-morecalifornians-borrow-at-triple-digit-interest-rates-will-the-state-crack-down-on-predatory-lending/ (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Payday Loans, Inc.: Short on Credit, Long on Debt, CENTER FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING 5 (Mar. 31, 2011) available at https://www.responsiblelending.org/paydaylending/research-analysis/payday-loan-inc.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (laying
out the various data concerning the inability for payday lendees to repay their loans).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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the first year of lending and 44% within their first two years. 37 These reports
signify a pattern of borrowers’ continuous indebtedness due to their inability to
fulfill other financial responsibilities while in repayment of a payday loan. 38
Section A discusses the mechanics of the payday lending industry and the
various political views underlying the industry’s continued propriety.39 Section B
introduces the wage-advance industry and the model under which it purports to
function separate from the payday lending framework. 40 Finally, Section C
compares the two industries and argues the government should treat them
indistinguishably when it comes to regulation.41
A. Payday Lending
“Quick and easy” payday loans wreak havoc on struggling Americans every
day.42 The payday lending industry offers high-interest, short-term loans to
consumers with damaged credit history, providing loan access to patrons that
traditional banks deny.43 Historically, payday lenders target unqualified
borrowers that cannot repay on time, resulting in an extension of the loans and
trapping borrowers in a cycle of insolvency.44
Due to the risky nature of the payday lending industry, lenders also charge
borrowers extremely high interest rates. 45 In some states, annual interest rates
may reach as high as 500%.46 Additionally, if a borrower cannot repay his debts,
payday lenders employ debt collectors to engage in ruthless and aggressive
conduct to recover the money.47
Shortly after its inception in the early 1990s, the payday lending industry
expanded to encompass over 10,000 lenders throughout the United States. 48
Today, that number has nearly doubled to over 20,000 storefronts across the
37. Susanna Montezemolo, Payday Lending Abuses and Predatory Practices, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING 6 (Sept. 2013) available at https://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/10-PaydayLoans.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); King & Parrish, supra note 34.
38. King & Parrish, supra note 34.
39. Infra Section II.A.
40. Infra Section II.B.
41. Infra Section II.C.
42. See Ethan D. Trotz, Using a Shotgun to Kill a Fly: Issues with the CFPB’s Payday Lending Proposal
and the Need to Incentivize Banks to Enter the Marketplace, 21 N.C. Banking Inst. 327, 329 (2017) (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing frequent payday lending practice to target low-income
individuals with little ability to pay back, ending them into a cycle of insolvency).
43. Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 857 (2007) (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
44. Trotz, supra note 42, at 328–29.
45. Kagan, supra note 4.
46. See, e.g., id. (illuminating how California allows for an APR of 459% off a 14-day, $100 loan).
47. Trotz, supra note 42, at 329.
48. See Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank Involvement, 9 N.C.
Banking Inst. 133, 136 (2005) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (asserting that more than
10,000 payday lenders operated within the US by 2000).
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nation.49 Despite the risky nature of the business, payday lenders generate $2
billion in revenue a year from the over sixty-five million loans distributed
annually, as well as from loan extension rollover fees. 50
Such rapid expansion and wide use of the industry’s services raises questions
over its largely controversial and unsavory public perception.51 Opponents of
payday lending suggest the industry’s practices trap already vulnerable subsets of
the community into further debt.52 Although payday lenders laud themselves as
an emergency service—only providing loans to borrowers for “unexpected
expenses”—the reality of payday lending tells a different story. 53 Of first-time
borrowers, 69% used payday loans for utilities, credit card bills, food, and other
recurring expenses, while only 16% used the loan for nonrecurring, unforeseen
expenses.54
Abbye Atkinson suggests that for credit (e.g., payday loans) to operate
effectively, lenders must only extend loans on terms that enhance the borrower’s
situation.55 If not, the borrower will remain insolvent and the debt will be just as
difficult, if not more difficult, to repay than when the lender offered the loan.56
Atkinson asserts, “[The] notion of credit as a social provision for the working
poor is deeply flawed. . . . [F]or credit to be ‘productive,’ the resulting debt must
be ‘repaid by a much richer borrower to whom that amount of debt is worth
less.’”57 For many Americans who utilize payday lending services, this is not the
case.58
Conversely, proponents of the industry argue that payday loans fill an
essential gap in the market: providing access to money for those denied by
traditional banks.59 With more locations in the United States than McDonald’s,
supporters applaud the expediency, convenience, and availability of payday
services.60 Legislators opposed to payday lending regulations argue that
prohibiting access to loans would constitute unwarranted government
interference with an important sector of the financial market. 61 To refute claims

49. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and Why 2
(2012), https://perma.cc/X3MD-2PBQ [hereinafter Payday Lending in America] (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
50. Bertics, supra note 48, at 136.
51. Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1107 (2019) (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Payday Lending in America, supra note 49.
55. Atkinson, supra note 51, at 1099.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1098–99 (quoting MONICA PRASAD, THE LAND OF TOO MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND
THE PARADOX OF POVERTY 239 (2012)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1105.
60. Trotz, supra note 42, at 327.
61. Aimee A. Minnich, Rational Regulation of Payday Lending, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 84, 88
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that payday lenders take advantage of vulnerable communities, payday lending
advocates point to data suggesting that 94% of payday borrowers have high
school diplomas, while 54% have obtained their college degree or attended some
college.62 The data expounded also asserts that all payday loan users possess
checking accounts and that over half of lenders earn incomes over the national
average.63 These figures convey a stark contrast to the story propounded by
opponents of the industry.64 The educational and income-levels of lenders
embrace a conclusion that lenders are well-informed and understand the
repercussions of taking out a payday loan.65 To proponents, these figures bolster
the conviction that regulation of the payday lending industry only hinders a
consumer’s right to choose.66
Debate continues over the proper balance between consumer choice and
consumer protection.67 Ultimately, the court of public opinion supports a
conclusion that regulation of payday lending is a social necessity.68
Representative Carolyn Maloney argued vehemently that legislation embracing
consumer choice, rather than consumer protection, “goug[es] low-income
consumers with outrageous interest rates.” 69 While lending in and of itself may
not pose explicit issues for consumers, the predatory practices associated with
high-interest lending highlights the ultimate issue and need for stronger
regulations.70
B. Wage-Advance Industry
In contrast to the payday lending industry, the wage-advance business has a
less checkered and controversial past. 71 In 2017, Walmart became one of the
(2006) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Compare id. (discussing the high educational and economic standing of payday lendees), with
Atkinson, supra note 51, at 1107 (analyzing the negative impacts of payday loans on impoverished sectors of
the community).
65. Minnich, supra note 61, at 88.
66. Id.
67. See Paris Ward, Your Rundown of the CFPB’s Payday Lending Rule: What It Means for You, CREDIT
KARMA (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.creditkarma.com/insights/i/rundown-payday-lending-rule-cfpb/ (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (outlining the continuous debate regarding the CFPB 2017 Rules
and the proper balance between consumer protection versus consumer choice).
68. See Atkinson, supra note 51, at 1107 (arguing that credit, such as payday lending, as a social
provision for low-income Americans is a faulty notion).
69. 164 CONG. REC. H1151 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2018) (statement of Rep. Maloney) (discussing H.R.
3299, which would allow national bank high-interest rate loans to stay attached to loans “rented” to secondary
markets).
70. Id. (statement of Rep. Waters) (arguing H.R. 3299 would open consumers up to a variety of abuses
state usury laws attempt to prevent).
71. See Michael Corkery, Walmart Will Let Its 1.4 Million Workers Take Their Pay Before Payday, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/business/walmart-workers-pay-advances.html (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (introducing the employer-integrated wage advance
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largest and most prominent companies to offer a wage-advance service to its
employees.72 The wage-advance application, called Even, allowed employees
access to their money before payday for days already worked.73 The application
further assisted employees in managing their money to make smarter financial
decisions.74 Previously skeptical Walmart employee, Alexis Adderley,
commended the application’s utility and ability to calculate—by examining her
bank account and her various reoccurring monthly expenses—the amount of
money necessary to access before payday.75
Wage-advance applications come in two forms: direct-to-consumer and
employer-integrated applications.76 The latter encompasses programs such as
Walmart’s Even application and work by marketing to employers to provide
wage-advances directly to their employees.77 Direct-to-consumer applications
work with the employee, independent from the employer, by deducting the
agreed upon amount from the lendee’s bank account on payday.78 While both
models effectively allow employees early access to wages, skeptics argue the
only appropriate form of wage-advance is employer-integrated.79
Employer-integrated applications often subsist through fees the employer
pays, leaving the employee to use its services at a reduced rate or even free of
charge.80 The financial tools and assistance employer-integrated applications
provide go further than other applications to help the employee make smarter
financial decisions.81 Associate Director of the National Consumer Law Center,
Lauren Saunders, asserted, “[t]rue early wage access providers are companies
that have agreements with the employer and are integrated with payroll and are
not making loans and seeking repayment from the customer.”82
In addition to the distinction between direct-to-consumer and employerintegrated applications, wage-advance models also differ in the type of fee they

application to help Walmart employees).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Middlebrook, supra note 7.
77. Id.; Michael Corkery, Walmart Will Let Its 1.4 Million Workers Take Their Pay Before Payday, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/business/walmart-workers-pay-advances.html (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
78. Middlebrook, supra note 7.
79. Penny Crosman, A Payday Lender in Disguise? New York Investigates the Earnin App, AM. BANKER
(Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/a-payday-lender-in-disguise-new-york-investigates-theearnin-app (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Stephen Middlebrook, What Business
Lawyers
Should
Know
About
Wage
Advance
Products,
A.B.A.
(Sept.
5,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2019/09/wage-advance/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
80. Middlebrook, supra note 7.
81. Id.
82. Crosman, supra note 79.

192

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52
charge to use their services. 83 Some wage-advance applications operate on a
monthly participation fee, while others employ a fee per transaction. 84 Other
wage-advance businesses, however, claim to operate without any fees at all. 85
Companies, such as Earnin, instead request the borrower’s consent to a
noncompulsory tip, which defaults to 10% of the cash withdrawn.86 Earnin,
however, labels money transfers as “activations” and claims it does not engage in
debt collection if the borrower is unable to repay. 87
C. Comparing the Two Industries
Despite the illegality or severe restriction of payday lending in 16 states,
wage-advance businesses continue to function unencumbered federally.88 The
industry argues it falls outside of the restrictions placed on payday lenders
because it does not consider itself a lending industry.89 Employer-integrated
wage-advance businesses maintain their model relies on payroll deductions rather
than extensions of credit to users. 90 Therefore, these companies argue they are
exempt from usury and lending laws because they subtract the advanced cash
before the deposit of the worker’s paycheck, rather than debiting a borrower’s
account.91 This reasoning may be compelling.92 The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) conceded that employer-employee based forms of
wage-advances might be exempt from federal lending laws due to the nature of
their services.93 However, with the postponement of the CFPB’s lending rule,
questions remain over the definitive parameters of wage-advance businesses’
federal exemption.94
While employee-integrated wage-advances may avoid federal usury
regulations, the CFPB lending rules will likely still encompass direct-toconsumer wage-advance businesses. 95 The direct-to-consumer wage-advance
83. Middlebrook, supra note 7; see Farivar, supra note 2 (discussing the various tipping schemes wage
advance apps use, such as “fees,” “tips,” etc.).
84. Middlebrook, supra note 7; Farivar, supra note 2.
85. Farivar, supra note 2.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See PayDay Loan Consumer Information, supra note 22 (Outlining the various states prohibiting or
restricting payday lending including Georgia, New York, New Jersey, Arkansas, New Hampshire, South
Dakota, Arizona, North Carolina, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West
Virginia, and the District Columbia).
89. See Farivar, supra note 2 (relaying the CEO of Earnin’s belief that they are not subject to the 2017
federal rules on payday lenders proposed by the CFPB or the Truth in Lending Act of 1968).
90. Middlebrook, supra note 7.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; Ward, supra note 67 (outlining the continuous debate regarding the viability of the CFPB 2017
Rules and resulting in the postponement the Rules’ enactment).
95. See Farivar, supra note 2 (discussing the direct access wage-advance business model and how there
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model, which operates through direct access to the lendee’s bank account,
presents problems outside the employer-integrated context.96 Overdrawn
accounts due to insufficient funds, a lack of financial tools in addition to the
lending service, and the absence of a responsible intermediary—such as an
employer—highlight just a few of these issues.97
For example, the Better Business Bureau’s website contains hundreds of
complaints from customers who use direct-to-consumer applications, such as
Earnin.98 Consumers predominantly reported suffering bank overdraft fees after
wage-advance businesses attempted multiple withdrawals from empty bank
accounts.99 While Earnin assures it will reimburse such fees, other customers
complain about the inability to contact the company to do so.100
The most infamous issue surrounding the direct-to-consumer wage-advance
model is the noncompulsory tip or monthly fee associated with using the
application.101 While the employer-integrated applications often offer additional
financial services on top of wage-advancement (which may justify the inclusion
of a fee) or allow employers to absorb the fee associated with using the system,
direct-to-consumer models lack both of these benefits. 102 Additionally, while the
tip is purportedly noncompulsory, internal analytics from Earnin suggest that
around 80% of consumers tip; and choosing not to tip can lower the amount of
cash a consumer may withdraw.103
Wage-advance companies contend, however, that their services are notably
dissimilar to payday lending because they do not extend “credit” and do not bring
legal actions against customers who are unable to repay. 104 Earnin prefers to
consider its service a “nonrecourse liquidity product” instead of a lending
service.105 Notwithstanding the progressive name attempting to distinguish the
industry, the wage-advance business will fail to make such a meaningful
distinction in the courts.106
is little different between its model and those of payday lenders).
96. Middlebrook, supra note 7.
97.
See Complaints About Earnin, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/us/ca/paloalto/profile/mobile-apps/earnin-1216-642613/complaints (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(displaying user complaints regarding payday lenders over-drafting accounts); see also Middlebrook, supra note
7 (highlighting the benefits of employer-integrated wage advance models, such as additional financial tools and
the presence of an employer, monitoring the wage advance transactions).
98. See id. (displaying over 250 complaints against the wage-advance company Earnin).
99. See id. (“HAS TRIED TO CONTACT THE COMPANY MULTIPLE TIMES BECAUSE OF
CONSTANT OVER DRAFT FEE FOR MULTIPLE WITHDRAWAL FEES. MY SON IS UNABLE TO
REMOVE HIS BANK ACCOUNT INFORMATION FROM THIS APP. HELP.”).
100. See id. (describing consumer inability to reach Earnin for overdraft fee reimbursement).
101. Farivar, supra note 2.
102. See Corkery, supra note 71 (discussing the benefits of employer-integrated applications, such as
financial management support).
103. Farivar, supra note 2.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, TN, Inc. (Turner v. E-Z Check), 35 F. Supp. 2d
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Wage-advance businesses argue they are not “creditors” under the definition
provided by the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and therefore are outside the
obligations imposed by the Act.107 TILA defines “creditor” as:
A person who both (1) regularly extends, whether in connection with loans
. . . or otherwise, consumer credit which . . . payment of a finance charge is or
may be required, and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising from the
consumer credit transaction is initially payable on the face of the evidence of
indebtedness or, if there is no such evidence of indebtedness, by agreement. 108
TILA also defines “credit” as “the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to
defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.” 109
The courts have attempted to define the limits of these TILA terms for
years.110 In Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, TN, Inc., a check-cashing
business allowed customers to write checks for the amount borrowed, plus a
service fee in exchange for an extension of a cash advance, payable within thirty
days.111 If the customer failed to repay the amount of the check within thirty days
or, alternatively, pay an additional service fee for E-Z to defer depositing the
check, the business would cash the check in the full amount.112 The court held
that E-Z’s practices constituted extensions of credit, as “[t]hey are disbursing
funds to people . . . on the promise of repayment of the sum plus the ‘service
charge,’ at a later time.”113 The court continued by stating, [i]f this is not an
extension of credit, this Court finds it hard to imagine any transaction that is.”114
The court added that Congress designed TILA to protect consumers from
deceptive lending practices; therefore, all courts should construe TILA broadly in
favor of consumer protection.115
Similarly, wage-advance businesses disburse funds to consumers with the
expectation of later payment.116 While wage-advance businesses requiring
mandatory service fees alongside their extension of credit appear to clearly fall
under TILA regulations, businesses with “noncompulsory tips” argue they do not
deserve the epithet “creditor.”117 Despite the discretionary nature of these
1042, 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (reasoning a check-cashing business extended “credit” for purposes of the Truth
in Lending Act).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (2020); Middlebrook, supra note 7.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (2020).
110. See Turner v. E-Z Check, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (attempting to define the terms “creditor” and
“credit” under TILA in connection to a check-cashing, deferred presentment transaction).
111. Turner v. E-Z Check, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1048.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1047.
116. Middlebrook, supra note 7.
117. See id. (discussing the difference between employer-integrated wage-advance businesses and nonemployer-integrated wage advance businesses, as well as the business models of wage-advance businesses that
offer services for a service fee or noncompulsory tip).
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charges, courts should hold these companies accountable as creditors due to the
coercive nature of the tipping schemes and the company’s ability to modify the
amount lent by the amount the consumer tips.118 Additionally, for a court to deem
a business a “creditor” under TILA, payment of a finance charge (i.e., a service
charge) is not a requisite condition.119
Wage-advance businesses also argue that, unlike deferred presentment
check-cashing businesses such as E-Z, they do not threaten legal action if
customers are unable to pay.120 However, threatened legal action was not
dispositive in the Turner court’s conclusion that E-Z was a “creditor” under
TILA.121 Therefore, the lack of legal repercussions by wage-advance businesses,
as well as the court’s presumption in favor of consumer protection, arguably tip
the scales in favor of holding noncompulsory tip-based wage-advance businesses
to be “creditors.”122
III. HISTORY OF PAYDAY LENDING REGULATIONS
Because wage-advance businesses are creditors and subject to the same
requirements as those of the payday lending industry, state and federal
governments must determine the best course of action in regulating them.123
Historically, the payday lending industry has enjoyed extensive latitude in
operating independent of banking laws.124 Section A discusses traditional usury
laws—both state and federal.125 Section B analyzes state usury laws’ continued
inability to regulate the payday lending industry due to federal preemption.126
Section C introduces the underlying public policy reasons that explain the
legislative and judicial hesitance to regulate the industry.127 Lastly, Section D
118. See Farivar, supra note 2 (discussing the internal analytics of Earnin, showing that most consumers
tip regardless of their noncompulsory nature and that the amount the wage-advance business is willing to lend
depends on how much a consumer tips).
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (defining “‘Creditor’ as ‘a person who both (1) regularly extends, whether
in connection with loans . . . or otherwise, consumer credit which . . . payment of a finance charge is or may be
required . . .’”) (emphasis added).
120. Farivar, supra note 2.
121. See Turner v. E-Z Check, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 (concluding that the check-cashing business’s
model of charging a service fee alongside the advancement of cash was significant in finding that the business
engaged in actions akin to that of a “creditor” extending “credit” to consumers).
122. See id. (concluding that the check-cashing business’s model of charging a service fee alongside the
advancement of cash was significant in finding that the business engaged in actions akin to that of a “creditor”
extending “credit” to consumers).
123. See Kirby M. Smith, Comment, Banking on Preemption: Allowing National Bank Act Preemption
for Third-Party Sales, 83 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1631, 1634 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(discussing the history of the creation of the NBA and OCC and their impact on the autonomy enjoyed by the
lending industry).
124. See id. (discussing the history of the creation of the NBA and OCC and their impact on the
autonomy enjoyed by the lending industry).
125. Infra Section III.A.
126. Infra Section III.B.
127. Infra Section III.C.
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argues that the regulation of usury laws, both state and federal, is only the
beginning in regard to the types of payday lending activities that governments
should regulate.128
A. Traditional Usury Laws
Usury laws limit the amount of interest a lender may charge on a loan.129
While states often implement usury laws, federal statutory provisions authorize
national banks to charge the maximum loan rate of the state in which the bank
certified its organization.130 Such provisions incentivize interstate banks to
strategically locate their branches in states with the highest permissible loan
rates, virtually deregulating interest rates and preempting state laws. 131
Payday lenders take advantage of such federal preemption provisions.132
Before selling the rights of a loan to payday lenders, out-of-state banks offer
payday loans to borrowers at the maximum rate of the state in which they are
certified.133 Consequently, payday lenders who acquire the loan but reside in
more restrictive usury law states take advantage of other states’ maximum
rates.134 This scheme, called “charter-renting,” allows payday lenders to
circumvent their own state’s regulations for the more favorable usury laws of the
out-of-state bank.135 While most banking regulators have prohibited charterrenting, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation continues to allow the
practice.136
Charter-renting and other payday lending practices that take advantage of
procedural loopholes raise a significant question regarding the US financial
regulatory framework: why have the federal and state governments not been able
to curb the conduct of the payday lending industry?137

128. Infra Section III.D.
129. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 187 (West Group, 2d ed. 2003).
130. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (202) (“Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or
discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by
the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the
discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district
where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and no more, except that where by the laws of any
State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for
associations organized or existing in any such State under title 62 of the Revised Statutes.”); MALLOY, supra
note 129 at 187.
131. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 43, at 871-872.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Smith, supra note 123, at 1634 (discussing the history of the creation of the NBA and OCC and
their impact on the lending industry).
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B. Historical Context & Federal Preemption
The first issue regarding the lack of payday lending regulations is rooted in
history.138 In 1864, Congress enacted the National Bank Act (“NBA”) in an effort
to create a national banking system separate from the states. 139 Through the NBA,
Congress chartered the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (“OCC”) to
oversee, regulate, and protect national banks against state interference. 140
Congress hoped the NBA would initiate the ultimate demise of state banking
systems and the conversion to one federally-regulated banking system.141 Despite
such hopes, federal banking unity has yet to occur, and the NBA and Supreme
Court interpretations of the NBA have had more damning than beneficial impacts
on the ability to regulate payday lenders effectively. 142
In Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, the Supreme Court held that national
banks were not subject to the interest rates of a state, so long as the bank’s rates
were within the limits of the state in which the bank was certified. 143 The Court
famously asserted that national banks were “national favorites” and must
therefore be protected from “unfriendly legislation by the States.” 144 The ruling
significantly established the binding federal common law that the NBA preempts
state usury laws.145
More recently, the Supreme Court extended the federal preemption doctrine
to national bank subsidiaries in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, NA.146 In 2006, a
federally-chartered bank and its subsidiary sued the Commissioner of the
Michigan Office of Insurance and Financial Services (“OFIS”) on the grounds
that the NBA and OCC regulations preempted Michigan’s state laws concerning
the national bank’s subsidiary—a previously state-chartered mortgage
company.147 While Michigan law exempted state and federal banks from state
mortgage lending laws, all subsidiaries had to subject themselves to state
supervision and registration with the state’s OFIS. 148 While the mortgage

138. See id. (discussing the history of the creation of the NBA and OCC and their impact on the lending
industry).
139. Id. at 1633; see also Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409 (1874) (calling national banks
“[n]ational favorites”).
140. Smith, supra note 123, at 1634.
141. See id. (explaining that, despite expectations, most state banks did not convert to national banks
after the NBA’s passage).
142. Id. at 1638.
143. Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 411.
144. Id. at 412–13.
145. Smith, supra note 123, at 1636; See Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 412 (discussing the congressional intent
behind the enactment of the NBA).
146. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 U.S. 1559, 1561 (2007) (holding that federal preemption
and the application of OCC regulations applies the same to nationally-chartered banks as it does to their
subsidiaries).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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company—Wachovia Mortgage—had previously registered with Michigan, it
surrendered its OFIS registration after it became a wholly owned subsidiary of
the federally-chartered Wachovia Bank.149 In response, the OFIS notified
Wachovia Mortgage that it could no longer perform mortgage services in
Michigan without reobtaining registration.150
The Supreme Court reiterated Congress’ intent in enacting the NBA when
ruling that the national bank and its subsidiary were exempt from state mortgage
laws that overlap with OCC regulations.151 The Court reasoned that Congress
created the NBA and the OCC to protect against “unduly burdensome and
duplicative state regulation.”152 Therefore, the power to examine and inspect
national banks and their subsidiaries—an enumerated power of the OCC—rests
not in the states’ hands, but in the OCC.153 The Watters ruling extended the
national bank favoritism articulated in Tiffany to its subsidiaries and created a
loophole for payday lenders and other charter-renting entities to take advantage
of less stringent usury laws.154
Interestingly, the Supreme Court heard the Watters case one year before the
U.S. market crash of 2008.155 After the crash, the Supreme Court once again
addressed the issue in Cuomo v. The Clearing House Association, L.L.C.156 In
Cuomo, the Supreme Court took a step back from its well-documented generosity
towards OCC-chartered banks, holding that the OCC’s interpretation of visitorial
rights—powers ironically granted to the OCC by the Watters Court—were
unreasonable.157 The Court narrowed the interpretation of Watters, arguing that it
had granted the OCC “general supervision and control” over a subsidiary of a
national bank, not the exclusive right to enforce laws against national banks
altogether.158 Therefore, the State Attorney General may bring enforcement
actions against nationally-chartered banks to enforce state laws still applicable to
the national banks.159 While Cuomo limited national banks’ power and reverted
some power back to the states regarding enforcement action, Watters remains
good law and became the stepping stone for payday lenders to avoid state laws
and utilize the benefits of charter-renting.160
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 1566 (asserting that Congress created the NBA “[t]o prevent inconsistent or intrusive state
regulations from impairing the national system.”).
152. Id. at 1567.
153. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2020); Watters, 127 U.S. at 1568.
154. See Watters, 127 U.S. at 1561 (discussing the intent of Congress to allow national banks larger
leeway and protection against state banks).
155. See id. at 1559 (hearing the case in 2007).
156. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 U.S. 2710, 2710–18 (2009).
157. Id. at 2719.
158. Id. at 2717.
159. Id. at 2717–18.
160. Compare Watters, 127 U.S. at 1562 (ruling in favor of national banks and their subsidiaries), with
Cuomo, 129 U.S. at 2717–18 (ruling against national banks and ultimately limiting the OCC’s power regarding
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Chartering a national bank is relatively simple. 161 During the application
period, the OCC reviews only the bank’s “business plan, management
experience, and financial resources.” 162 Due to such accessibility and the holding
in Watters, payday lenders take advantage of national banks by operating as their
subsidiaries, subsequently benefitting from the higher interest rates of the states
in which the national bank is certified. 163 This allows payday lenders to operate in
states with stricter usury laws without subjecting themselves to such laws. 164
The recent Second Circuit opinion in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC,
however, brought more uncertainty to the payday lending scheme of charterrenting.165 After nationally chartered Bank of America sold the rights of Saliha
Madden’s account to Midland Funding, a debt collector, Midland sued Madden
to collect on the unpaid balance of the credit. 166 Madden, however, contended
that the interest rate charged by Bank of America could not be transferred to or
collected by Midland due to New York usury laws, where the debt collectors
were located.167 Essentially, Madden argued that Midland was neither a national
bank nor a subsidiary of a national bank and, therefore, could not claim
exemption from state usury laws.168
In ruling that federal preemption does not carry over to assignees of a
national bank, the court highlighted the lack of interest retained by the previous
owner—the national bank.169 While only persuasive in most jurisdictions, the
Second Circuit’s holding in Madden has disconcerted the payday lending
industry.170 Unless subsidiaries to a national bank, payday lenders in the business
of charter-renting may no longer be able to claim federal preemption.171
C. Public Policy
Another issue impeding enforcement against the payday and wage-advance
industry is the desire, or lack thereof, for public officials to do so. 172 As discussed

visitorial powers).
161. Smith, supra note 123, at 1638.
162. Id.
163. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 43, at 871–72.
164. Id.
165. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251–52 (2d Cir. 2015).
166. Id. at 247–48.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 247–49.
169. Id. at 252 & n.2; Smith, supra note 123, at 1654.
170. See Madden, 786 F.3d at 249 (holding that assignees must abide by the usury laws of the state in
which they are located and do not reserve the federal preemption afforded the national bank which sold the
rights of the loan).
171. See id. (holding that assignees must abide by the usury laws of the state in which they are located
and do not reserve the federal preemption afforded the national bank which sold the rights of the loan).
172. See Atkinson, supra note 51, at 1105 (discussing the various policy considerations of payday
lending regulation).
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above, much debate remains over whether such regulations are harmful or
advantageous to the overall welfare of society.173 The contention is discernable
from the ongoing debate over the CFPB 2017 Rules. 174
In 2017, the CFPB issued a proposed rule that strived to regulate the payday
lending industry.175 The payday lending rule originally included a prospective
“ability-to-repay” provision, requiring payday lenders to evaluate borrowers’
ability to repay before entrusting them with a loan. 176 The provision would
restrict unqualified borrowers from taking out payday loans, thereby preventing
possible defaults and patterns of insolvency.177 Opponents of the “ability-torepay” provision, including the payday lending industry itself, argue it will
restrict the market so severely as to kill the industry entirely.178
In January of 2019, the CFPB repealed the “ability-to-repay” provision after
its new director, Kathy Kraninger, stated the rule would harm consumers most
dependent on the industry’s loans.179 The CFPB also looks to review the viability
of a similar proposed provision that limits a consumer’s ability to reborrow
consistently.180 Originally projected to take effect in 2017, the CFPB has
postponed the payday lending rules’ enactment until November 2020 to engage
in further review.181 Due to the delay, the federal government has yet to
implement a cohesive set of rules that would effectively regulate payday lending
behavior at a national level.182 The CFPB 2017 Rules underscore the lack of
consensus among federal administrations over the proper balance between
payday lending regulations and autonomy.183
D. High Interest Rates: Tip of the Iceberg
While state legislators often advocate for stronger usury laws, the ability of

173. See id. (discussing the various policy considerations of payday lending regulation).
174. Ward, supra note 67 (outlining the continuous debate regarding the CFPB 2017 Rules).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Kate Berry, CFPB to Scrap Key Underwriting Portion of Payday Rule, AMERICAN BANKER (Jan.
14, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-to-scrap-key-underwriting-portion-ofpayday-rule (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
181. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans; Delay of Compliance Date;
Correcting Amendments, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policycompliance/rulemaking/final-rules/payday-vehicle-title-and-certain-high-cost-installment-loans-delaycompliance-date-correcting-amendments/ (last visited July 3, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
182. See Ward, supra note 67 (“Consumer advocates are worried that the CFPB’s proposal to strike the
ability-to-repay requirement is a sign that the agency is backing away from its mission of protecting Americans
from unfair financial practices and regulating financial products like student loans and payday loans.”).
183. Id. (outlining the continuous debate regarding the CFPB 2017 Rules).
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payday lenders to federally charter-rent makes such usury laws a nullity.184
Furthermore, the regulation of high interest rates among payday lenders merely
scratches the surface regarding the regulatable practices of payday lenders. 185
Legislators must refocus their attention from the distracting shimmer of usury
charges to the various other issues littering the payday lending market, such as
deceptive business practices. 186
In 1914, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Trade Commission
Act into law, effectively creating the FTC.187 Designed to protect consumer
interests and promote economic competition, Congress gave the FTC the power
to prohibit unfair or deceptive practices in commerce. 188 Utilizing this power, the
FTC has recently cracked down on the deceptive business practices of the payday
lending industry.189
In FTC v. AMG Capital Management, the FTC sued the payday lending
entity AMG Capital (“AMG”) for inaccurately disclosing the terms of its
loans.190 The Ninth Circuit held that the Loan Note would not put a reasonable
consumer on notice of the total payment due to its misleading nature.191 The
Ninth Circuit also affirmed the $1.27 billion in equitable monetary relief for
victims of AMG’s payday lending scheme.192 The Ninth Circuit’s holding marks
one of the largest settlements against the payday lending industry and displays an
increasing determination by the FTC to control the once rogue industry. 193
IV. FUTURE REGULATION
Despite the state and federal governments’ previous inability to effectively
regulate the payday lending industry, recent developments—such as the

184. See generally Watters, 127 U.S. at 1562 (holding that federal preemption applies to subsidiaries of
national banks).
185. See generally AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d at 423 (holding a payday lending company
liable for deceptive business practices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
186. See generally id. (holding a payday lending company liable for deceptive business practices in
violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
187. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), (2) (2020); Our History, FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history (last visited June 26, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
189. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d at 423 (holding payday lending company, AMG Capital
Management, liable for the deceptive business practice of misleading customers via the Loan Note).
190. Id. at 422.
191. Id. at 423.
192. Id. at 428.
193. See generally id. (upholding the $1.27 billion judgement against AMG Capital); U.S. Court Finds in
FTC’s Favor and Imposes Record $1.3 Billion Judgment Against Defendants Behind AMG Payday Lending
Scheme, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/10/us-court-finds-ftcs-favor-imposesrecord-13-billionjudgment#:~:text=U.S.%20Court%20Finds%20in%20FTC’s,Lending%20Scheme%20%7C%20Federal%20Tra
de%20Commission (Oct. 4, 2016) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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monetary award granted in FTC v. AMG Management Capital and the holding in
Madden v. Midland Funding LLC—give hope that regulation is possible.194 To
effectively regulate payday and wage-advance lenders in the future, the federal
government must continue to pursue litigation akin to FTC v. AMG in an effort to
curb deceptive business practices beyond merely the unconscionability of high
usury charges.195 The ability of the FTC to target all forms of practices the FTCA
deems “deceptive” gives the agency a unique position to police all lending
activity without the bureaucratic obstacles associated with legislation. 196
State governments should also implement their own regulatory schemes to
curb the payday lending and wage-advance industries. 197 One suggestion is to
criminalize the business of payday lenders within the state. 198 Through the use of
their police powers, states can overcome the federal preemption issues associated
with state usury laws by deeming the very practice of payday lending illegal. 199
In essence, state laws attempting to limit payday loan interest rates and practices
would be replaced with the criminalization of the industry altogether. 200
Some states already utilize this tactic. 201 New York and New Jersey have
outlawed payday lenders from conducting business in their states. 202 Georgia, on
the other hand, prohibits payday lenders from operating through the use of
racketeering laws.203 North Carolina—ironically one of the first states to
authorize payday lending—reached an agreement to temporarily halt payday
lending within the state in 2006.204
194. See generally AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d at 423 (holding, notably, a payday lending
company liable for their deceptive business practices regarding a Loan Note); Madden, 786 F.3d at 249 (holding
assignees of a loan accountable to the usury laws in which they are located).
195. See generally AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d at 423 (regulating a payday lending company
for deceptive business practices); Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 249 (2d Cir. 2015)
(declaring the assignees of a loan subject to the usury laws of the place in which assignees were located).
196. See Madden, 786 F.3d at 249 (holding assignees of a loan accountable to the usury laws in their
respective states of business).
197. See AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d at 423 (upholding the $1.27 billion judgement against
AMG Capital by arguing that the business was engaging in deceptive/fraudulent business practices).
198. PayDay Loan Consumer Information, supra note 22 (discussing New York’s and New Jersey’s
criminal usury statutes outlawing payday loans over 35% APR).
199. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 190.40 (McKinney 2020) (setting a usury cap at 25% interest, virtually
outlawing short-term, high-fee loans).
200. Compare Watters, 127 U.S. at 1566 (allowing national banks massive leeway and protection against
state bank usury laws), with § 190.40 (setting a usury cap at 25% interest, virtually outlawing short-term, highfee loans), and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-19 (West, 2020) (setting a usury cap at 30% interest, also outlawing
short-term, high-fee loans in New Jersey).
201. See PayDay Loan Consumer Information, supra note 22 (outlining the New York and New Jersey
usury statutes criminalizing the activity of payday lending).
202. § 190.40; § 2C: 21-19.
203. See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-17-1 et seq. (2020); see Shobhit Seth, Racketeering, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr.
10, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/racketeering.asp (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (“Racketeering may refer to the act of acquiring a business operation through illegal activity,
operating a business with illegally-derived income, or using a business operation to commit illegal acts.”).
204. Uriah King, et al., Financial Quicksand: Payday Lending Sinks Borrowers into Debt with $4.2
Billion in Predatory Fees Every Year, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 5 (Nov. 30, 2006),
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Arguments against criminalization of payday lending mirror arguments
against regulation of the industry.205 Outlawing payday lending will potentially
prevent informed consumers from accessing essential cash and force them to
seek alternative avenues. 206 After Ohio virtually banned payday loans in 2008,
residents in need of cash turned to pawn shops for emergency credit.207 Pawn
shops, which operate through the exchange of valuable items for credit, saw a
97% increase in use after the payday lending ban.208 Such data reaffirms a
conclusion that payday lending might actually fill an essential gap in the financial
market.209 However, the Center For Responsible Lending projected that citizens
in North Carolina and Pennsylvania—two states that have banned payday
lending—would save a total of $1.4 billion in predatory payday fees due to the
restrictions.210
Federal circuits should also follow the Second Circuit’s lead, adopting the
holding of Madden v. Midland Funding LLC.211 Adoption of Madden would
create a cohesive expectation that federal courts no longer tolerate payday
lenders’ practice of charter-renting.212
Payday lenders—and now wage advance businesses—will no longer be able
to utilize federal preemption as a loophole to charge higher usury rates than the
state in which they are located.213 The extension of the Madden ruling will also
allow state usury laws to reacquire purpose by forcing payday and wage-advance
lenders located in the state to follow its regulations.214
Alongside judicial opinions limiting the once unchecked power of national
banks and their subsidiaries, the CFPB should reinstate the CFPB 2017 Rules in
their original form.215 The rules should include an ability-to-repay provision to
assess the borrower’s capacity to repay the loan and to avoid the possibility of
https://responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/rr012-Financial_Quicksand-1106.pdf (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
205. See Minnich, supra note 61, at 88 (discussing the benefits of consumer choice, as well as the need
for payday loans to fill an essential gap in the market).
206. See Atkinson, supra note 51, at 1105 (outlining and refuting the argument that payday loans fill an
essential gap in the market).
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QUARTZ (Mar. 1, 2019), https://qz.com/1561643/ohios-ban-on-payday-loans-sent-people-running-to-pawnshops/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing Ohio’s Short-Term Loan Law that
limited APR to 28%, effectively outlawing payday lenders within the state).
208. Id.
209. See id. (outlining the argument that consumers across the nation rely on payday lending as an
essential service).
210. King, supra note 204.
211. See Madden, 786 F.3d at 249 (holding assignees of a loan accountable to the usury laws in their
respective states of business).
212. See id. (holding a debt collector’s practice of charter-renting from the national bank who assigned
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213. See id. (restricting assignees of national banks’ ability to utilize federal preemption as a means to
skirt state laws).
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cyclical insolvency.216
V. CONCLUSION
The payday lending industry has gone virtually unregulated since its
inception in the early 1990s.217 And with the wage-advance industry emerging,
federal and state consumer-protection regulations are more crucial than ever.218
While the wage-advance industry refuses to concede they are payday lenders, the
reality remains that the two are indistinguishable markets and should be regulated
accordingly.219 However, regulation is easier said than done.220 The government’s
historical inability—or refusal—to regulate the payday lending industry has
presented problems that have just recently begun to resolve.221 The FTC’s and
federal courts’ willingness to hold lenders accountable and give effect to state
usury laws is a recent development in U.S. history.222 Federal and state
governments’ continued insistence on holding the industry accountable—through
litigation, federal payday lending rules, and state criminalization of the
industry—is necessary to protect consumers and financial institutions.223 Despite
wage-advance businesses’ claims of ease and expedience in using their
applications, the unresolved and deep-seated issues surrounding the lending
industry, indeed, make wage-advance app too good to be true.224
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